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2Abstract
A bit error rate (BER)-based physical layer security approach is proposed for finite blocklength. For
secure communication in the sense of high BER, the information-theoretic strong converse is combined
with cryptographic error amplification achieved by substitution permutation networks (SPNs) based
on confusion and diffusion. For discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), an analytical framework is
provided showing the tradeoffs among finite blocklength, maximum/minimum possible transmission
rates, and BER requirements for the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Also, the security gap is
analytically studied for Gaussian channels and the concept is extended to other DMCs including binary
symmetric channels (BSCs) and binary erasure channels (BECs). For fading channels, the transmit
power is optimized to minimize the outage probability of the legitimate receiver subject to a BER
threshold for the eavesdropper.
Index Terms
BER, error amplification, finite blocklength, physical layer security, strong converse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a critical issue in communications [1] and it is particularly challenging with a
growing number of different wireless communication applications and various wireless devices.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, the wireless security is inherently more
vulnerable than the wired security: the eavesdropper may overhear and interpret the messages in
wireless communications more easily than in wireline communications. Traditionally, the issue
of security has been addressed at a higher layer by cryptography, which requires secret keys. A
problem of this approach is that it is often challenging to distribute and manage the secret keys,
especially for many emerging wireless networks. Furthermore, once the devices are physically
compromised by an adversary, the communication is no longer secure.
As a fundamentally different approach, the physical layer security, particularly information
theoretic security, has received a lot of attention. The information-theoretic security is based on
the pioneering work of [2], where the channel from the transmitter (Alice) to the eavesdropper
(Eve) was assumed to be a degraded version of the channel from Alice to the legitimate
receiver (Bob), namely the degraded wiretap channel. For this channel, Wyner derived the
capacity-equivocation region. Later, this work was extended to the non-degraded case, where the
eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily a degraded version of the legitimate user’s channel [3],
and also applied to Gaussian channels [4]. Recently, the information theoretic security and/or
3the physical layer security have regained much interest for secure wireless communications.
In most of the works in the area of physical layer security, the security metric is defined
based on mutual information between Alice and Eve. If the mutual information is strictly zero,
it is perfectly secure, called perfect security [1]. With perfect security, Eve cannot obtain any
additional information about Alice’s message from Eve’s received signal. However, in order
to ensure such perfect security, the entropy of the secret key must not be smaller than the
entropy of the source message. In real communications, therefore, it is not practical to try to
achieve the perfect security. Addressing this issue, two non-perfect security notions have been
extensively studied: weak secrecy [2] and strong secrecy. The weak secrecy requires that the
mutual information rate, i.e., mutual information divided by the blocklength (or codelength),
approaches zero when the blocklength goes to infinity. On the other hand, the strong secrecy
requires that the mutual information itself approaches zero when the blocklength goes to infinity.
Many researchers have designed codes providing the weak secrecy or strong secrecy [5]– [10].
Vast majority of the works have been devoted to the weak secrecy, mostly based on low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes [5], [6] or polar codes [7] (also, see the references in [10]). Because
designing codes to achieve the strong secrecy is generally much more difficult, the works for the
strong secrecy were generally limited to simplistic scenarios such as noiseless Bob’s channel [7],
[8] or binary symmetric channel [9]. However, it has been argued that the weak secrecy might
be a too weak security condition [11], [12], and in fact, one can easily construct examples of
codes achieving weak security that are never secure in practice [10]. A problem of those codes
in [5]– [10] is that they are not directly applicable to continuous-input channels, such as additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) or fading channels. Another (perhaps more serious) problem is
that, for finite blocklength, it is not clear how to evaluate or quantify the strength of security
actually achieved by the codes designed based on strong or weak secrecy secrecy. Unless the
blocklength is very long, the codes might not be secure enough to be used in practical systems,
especially for the case of weak secrecy.
Other than the information theoretic security notions based on mutual information, there are
few other security measures considered in the literature. For example, the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) has been used as a secrecy measure in the area of physical layer security
based on signal processing techniques [13], [14]. However, it is unclear how to exactly set an
SINR threshold and to evaluate what strength (or kind) of security can be actually achieved
4by an SNIR threshold. Another security measure considered in the literature is the block error
probability, i.e., decoding error probability of codeword. When the transmission rate is above the
channel capacity, by the strong converse [15], the block error probability approaches one as the
blocklength tends to infinity. Given a security condition in terms of block error probability, for
a Gaussian wiretap channel, the authors of [16] studied the asymptotic transmission rate and the
rate for finite blocklength using a rate approximation expression [17, Theorem 54] for AWGN
channels. In [18], a coset lattice code was designed to ensure high block error probability at
Eve and low block error probability at Bob. However, a limitation of the approach based on
the block error probability only is that high block error probability at Eve does not necessarily
mean secure communication. This is because a block error event simply means that there is at
least one bit error within a block (or codeword). As an example, if there is always only one bit
error in a block, the block error probability is one. However, all the remaining bits except the
particular single bit can be decoded by Eve, which is certainly not secure.
Arguably, a practically effective and useful security measure in the physical layer security
might be the bit error rate (BER). If it is possible to ensure that Eve’s BER is (very close to)
0.5, she essentially cannot recover any information bits transmitted by Alice. In [19], for AWGN
channels, punctured LDPC codes were designed to ensure high BER at Eve. The analysis was
limited to asymptotic case of LDPC codes and Eve’s BER is evaluated only by simulations, from
which it is not easy to obtain any theoretical insights. In [20], to induce high BER at Eve for
AWGN channels, Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocuenghem (BCH) codes and LDPC codes are combined
with scrambling/descrambling. The BER analysis of BCH codes was based on an approximate
BER equation of [21] under the assumption of bounded-distance decoding with hard decision,
and the study on LDPC codes was purely based on simulations.
In this paper, we also adopt the BER as the security measure for Eve. Using Gallager’s
random coding exponent and the strong converse over general discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs), we first ensure that Bob’s block error probability tends to zero and Eve’s block error
probability tends to one. To amplify the errors such that Eve’s BER is close to 0.5, we then
utilize substitution permutation networks (SPNs). In particular, the error amplification by SPN
is not only mathematically analyzed based on the ideal modeling, but also numerically evaluated
based on actual simulation of a real SPN. Given BER requirements for Bob and Eve, for finite
blocklength, we analyze the maximum and minimum possible transmission rates. Also, the
5security gap is defined and analyzed for AWGN channels and then the concept is extended to
other DMCs. Focusing on Gaussian-input fading channels, we analytically optimize the transmit
power to minimize Bob’s reliability outage probability, subject to a security condition given in
terms of a BER lower-bound threshold for Eve. The summary of the contributions is as follows:
• For secure communication in the sense of high BER, the information-theoretic strong
converse is combined with cryptographic error amplification achieved by SPNs based on
confusion and diffusion.
• For DMCs, an analytical framework is provided showing the trade-offs among finite block-
length, maximum/minimum possible transmission rates, and BER requirements for Bob and
Eve.
• For Gaussian channels, with finite blocklength, the security gap is analytically studied and
the concept is extended to other DMCs including binary symmetric channels (BSCs) and
binary erasure channels (BECs).
• For fading channels, with finite blocklength, the transmit power is analytically optimized
to minimize Bob’s outage probability subject to a BER threshold for Eve.
A practical benefit of the BER-based physical layer security is particularly evident when both
Bob’s and Eve’s channels are good and the channel quality difference is small: Cb > Ce ≫ 1
with Cb−Ce ≪ 1, where Cb is Bob’s capacity and Ce is Eve’s capacity. If the weak secrecy or
strong secrecy constraint is imposed, the transmission rate is bounded by the secrecy capacity
given by Cb − Ce ≪ 1 for the channels such as symmetric degraded wiretap channels [22] or
Gaussian channels [4]. On the other hand, if the high BER condition is imposed as a security
constraint and our approach is taken, the transmission rate can go up to Cb ≫ 1. Another
benefit of the proposed approach is that, for finite blocklength, we can ensure a high target BER
requirement for Eve, whereas for weak/strong secrecy, it is not entirely clear how to ensure a
particular security requirement with finite blocklength.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, Gallager’s random coding
exponent and the strong converse are reviewed to derive Bob’s block error probability upper-
bound and Eve’s block error probability lower-bound. Also, it is demonstrated that the errors can
be effectively amplified by SPNs. In Section III, we first combine the strong converse and the
SPNs. Then the maximum/minimum rates and security gaps are analyzed given finite blocklength
and the BER requirements for Bob and Eve. Also, for fading cha
6is optimized to minimize the reliability outage probability subject to a security condition. In
Section IV, some numerical results are presented and the paper is concluded in Section V.
Notation: We use A := B to denote that A, by definition, is equal to B, and we use A =: B
to denote that B, by definition, is equal to A. Also, CN (0, σ2) denotes a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with variance σ2 (or variance σ2/2 per dimension).
II. GALLGER FUNCTION, STRONG CONVERSE, AND ERROR AMPLIFICATION
Assume that message M represented by K bits is transmitted by Alice. Using a code composed
of 2K codewords, the message is encoded into a codeword Xn of n symbols. The transmission
rate R is given by
R =
K ln 2
n
(nats/channel use). (1)
Bob’s received codeword is denoted by Y nb and Eve’s received codeword is denoted by Y ne . As-
suming both channels are DMCs, they are described by the conditional probability distributions
fYb|X(yb|x) and fYe|X(ye|x), respectively, for Bob and Eve. Let Mˆb and Mˆe denote the decoded
messages at Bob and Eve, respectively. Let Cb and Ce denote the channel capacities for Bob
and Eve, respectively.
A. Bob’s Block Error Probability based on Gallager Function
Let C denote a code whose symbols X are randomly generated by input distribution qX(x),
which is simply denoted by q(x) whenever there is no ambiguity. Let P berr(R|C) = Pr(M 6=
Mˆb|C) denote the decoding error probability of code C at Bob. Let P berr(R) denote the average
probability over the ensemble of all codes at Bob. The ensemble average block error probability
P berr(R) at Bob can be upper-bounded as follows [23, Theorem 5.6.2]:
P berr(R) = E[P
b
err(R|C)] ≤ P
b,U
err (R, ρ, q(x)) (2)
where the upper-bound P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q(x)) is given by
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q(x)) = exp
(
−n
{
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))− ρR
})
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (3)
In the above equation, Gallager function Eb0 (ρ, q(x)) is given by
Eb0 (ρ, q(x)) = − ln
∑
yb
[∑
x
q(x)fYb|X(yb|x)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (4)
7where
∑
x is replaced by
∫
x
if X is continuous, and
∑
Yb
is replaced by
∫
Yb
if Yb is continuous.
Since the upper-bound P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q(x)) is valid for any 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and for any distribution q(x),
the bound can be tightened by optimizing ρ and q(x) as follows:
min
0≤ρ≤1
min
q(x)
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q(x)) (5)
or
min
0≤ρ≤1
{
max
q(x)
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))− ρR
}
. (6)
In this paper, we will use q˘(x) and ρ˘ to denote the optimal distribution and optimal ρ, respectively,
which are defined as follows:
q˘(x) = argmin
q(x)
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q(x)) = argmax
q(x)
Eb0 (ρ, q(x)) (7)
ρ˘ = arg min
0≤ρ≤1
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) = arg max
0≤ρ≤1
{
Eb0 (ρ, q˘(x))− ρR
}
. (8)
When R < Ib(q(x)), the exponent in (3) is positive with maximization over ρ [23, Section
5.6, p. 143]:
max
0≤ρ≤1
{
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))− ρR
}
> 0, R < Ib(q(x)). (9)
When R < Cb, the exponent in (3) is positive with maximization over q(x) and ρ [23, Section
5.6, p. 143]:
max
0≤ρ≤1
{
max
q(x)
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))− ρR
}
> 0, R < Cb. (10)
When R < Cb, therefore, there exists at least one code of which block error probability upper-
bound tends exponentially to zero as n → ∞. With the optimal q˘(x) yielding the tightest
upper-bound, the asymptotic slope of Eb0 (ρ, q(x)) when ρ approaches zero from the right is the
capacity of Bob’s channel [23, Section 5.6]:
Cb = lim
ρ↓0
1
ρ
max
q(x)
Eb0 (ρ, q(x)) (11)
= max
q(x)
∂
∂ρ
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))
∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
. (12)
8B. Eve’s Block Error Probability based on Arimoto’s Strong Converse
Let P eerr(R|C) = Pr(M 6= Mˆe|C) denote the block error probability of code C at Eve. We first
define P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q′(x)) as follows
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, q′(x)) = 1− exp (−n {Ee0(ρ
′, q′(x))− ρ′R}) , − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 (13)
where Ee0(ρ′, q′(x)) is given by (4) with q(x), fYb|x(yb|x), and ρ replaced by q′(x), fYe|x(ye|x),
and ρ′, respectively. When R > Ce and a priori probabilities are equal, Eve’s block error
probability P eerr(R|C) of any code C is be lower bounded by [15], [24, Eq. (3.9.21)]:
P eerr(R|C) ≥ P
e,L
err (R, ρ
′, q˘′(x)), ∀C (14)
where q˘′(x) is given by
q˘′(x) = argmin
q′(x)
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, q′(x)) = argmin
q′(x)
Ee0(ρ
′, q′(x)). (15)
Note that, unlike the case of upper-bound, the single-letter expression (14) of the lower-bound
is obtained with the particular input distribution q˘′(x).1 Since lower-bound P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q˘′(x)) is
still valid for any −1 < ρ′ ≤ 0, the tightest bound can be obtained by optimizing ρ′ as follows:
ρ˘′ = arg max
−1<ρ′≤0
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, q˘′(x)) = arg max
−1<ρ′≤0
{Ee0(ρ
′, q˘′(x))− ρ′R} . (16)
When R > Ce, the exponent in (13) is positive with maximization over ρ′ and minimization
over q′(x): [15, Theorem 2] [24, Theorem 3.9.1]:
max
−1<ρ′≤0
{
min
q′(x)
Ee0(ρ
′, q′(x))− ρ′R
}
> 0, R > Ce. (17)
When R > Ce and a priori probabilities are equal, therefore, the error probability upper-bound
of any code tends exponentially to one as n→∞. With the particular distribution q˘′(x) yielding
the valid lower-bound for any code, the asymptotic slope of Ee0(ρ′, q′(x)) when ρ′ approaches
zero from the left is the capacity of Eve’s channel [15]:
Ce = lim
ρ′↑0
1
ρ′
min
q′(x)
Ee0(ρ
′, q′(x)) (18)
= max
q′(x)
∂
∂ρ′
Ee0(ρ
′, q′(x))
∣∣∣∣
ρ′=0
. (19)
1Compared to the upper-bound tightened by q˘(x), the lower-bound determined by q˘′(x) might be considered to be weaker or
less tight because q˘′(x) is obtained by minimizing Ee0(ρ′, q(x)) rather than maximizing it. In return, the obtained lower-bound
is valid for all possible codes (rather than some codes in the ensemble as in the upper-bound case).
9C. Confusion and Diffusion: Error Amplification by SPN in Cryptography
In this subsection, the issue of error amplification is discussed. In cryptography, error ampli-
fication has been extensively and systematically studied for various applications including hash
functions and block ciphers such as Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [25]. A most common approach is to use substitution-boxes (S-boxes), which
are designed based on several criterions such as the completeness, avalanche property, etc. In
particular, the avalanche property plays a very important role. This property was first introduced
by Feistel [26]; but, the fundamental concept was actually based on Shannon’s confusion [1].
In [27], strict avalanche criterion (SAC) was defined as follows: SAC is satisfied if, whenever a
single input bit is complemented, each of all output bits changes with a 50% probability. Also,
high degree SAC can be defined [28]– [31]: SAC of degree l is satisfied if, whenever l input
bits are complemented at the same time, each of the output bits changes with a 50% probability.
In general, it is very difficult to design large-size S-boxes satisfying SAC. In today’s practical
cryptographic systems, therefore, small-size S-boxes are often used; for example, 8× 8 S-boxes
are used for AES. In order to handle a larger number of input bits at the same time, substitution-
permutation networks (SPNs) are often used. An SPN is composed of multiple parallel-connected
S-boxes taking multiple input bits. The output bits from those S-boxes are permutated by a
permutation box (P-box). Typically, an SPN is designed by implementing several rounds of
alternating S-boxes and P-boxes.2 In fact, the design of alternating S-boxes and P-boxes is
based on Shannon’s two fundamental security concepts: confusion and diffusion [1]. In SPNs
for cryptographic applications, secret keys are typically used. In this paper, however, we do not
use any secret keys for SPNs because we will use SPNs only to amplify the errors (rather than
encrypting data as in cryptography). In the following, the error amplification effect of SPNs is
evaluated first by analysis assuming ideal S-boxes and then by simulation using real S-boxes.
In [32], assuming ideal S-boxes satisfying SAC, the output error probability of the SPN was
analyzed. Let K denote the number of input and output bits of the SPN. Let Wr denote the
random variable representing the number of bit errors after round r. Let B denote the number
of input and output bits of each S-box. Assuming K is an integer multiples of B, we use
J = K
B
to denote the number of S-boxes connected in parallel for each round. Let Lr denote
2For example, AES has 10 rounds for 128 bit secret keys, 12 rounds for 192 bit secret keys, and 14 rounds for 256 bit secret
keys.
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the random variable representing the number of S-boxes in round r affected by the bit errors.
The distribution of Wr is given by [32]3
qWr(wr) =
J∑
lr=1
fWr|Lr(wr|lr)
K∑
wr−1=1
fLr |Wr−1(lr|wr−1)qWr−1(wr−1), for wr = 1, · · · , K (20)
where
fLr|Wr−1(lr|wr−1) =
A1(lr, wr−1)
A2(wr−1)
, for lr = 1, · · · , J (21)
A1(l, w) =
J∑
i=J−l
(−1)i−(J−l)
(
i
J − l
)(
J
i
)(
(J − i)B
w
)+
(22)
A2(w) =
(
K
w
)
(23)
fWr |Lr(wr|lr) =
1
(2B − 1)lr
lr∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
lr
i
)(
(lr − i)B
wr
)+
. (24)
In the above equation,
(
a
b
)+
=
(
a
b
)
if a ≥ b;
(
a
b
)+
= 0 if a < b. Using qWr(wr), the BER at the
output of the SPN after r rounds can be determined as follows
P SPNBER(r,K) =
1
K
K∑
wr=1
wrqWr(wr), r = 1, 2, · · · . (25)
In order to actually determine the BER using (25), the initial distribution qW0(w0) must be
explicitly given. As an example, for the scenario where there is only a single input bit error,
the initial distribution is given by
qW0(w0) =

 1, if w0 = 10, otherwise. (26)
In Fig. 1, the output BER analytically obtained by (20)–(26) is plotted for different sizes of
SPNs with B = 8. The number J of S-boxes for each round is given by K
8
. One can see that,
with a small number r of rounds, the BER is generally smaller for larger K, because it takes
more rounds for the case of large K to spread the errors over the entire bits. However, for larger
number of rounds (e.g., r ≥ 4), the BER is essentially 0.5 regardless of the size K of the SPN.
Above analysis and numerical results are based on the ideal S-boxes satisfying SAC. We now
evaluate the BER of an actual SPN composed of real S-boxes. In this paper, as an example,
we use the actual 8× 8 S-boxes adopted for AES [25, Fig. 3.8], which is known to have good
3Although this expression is given in closed-form, it becomes difficult to use as K increases, because the computational
complexity grows with K very quickly.
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avalanche property [33]. For the case of single input bit error, Fig. 2 shows the output BER
obtained by simulations. One can see that, by increasing the number r of rounds, it is possible to
make the output BER close to 0.5. This means that the input error can be effectively amplified
by actual SPNs.
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Number of rounds (r)
O
ut
pu
t B
ER
 o
f S
PN
,  
P b
erSP
N,
L (r
,K
)
 
 
K=16
K=32
K=64
K=128
K=256
Fig. 1. BER at the output of the SPN composed of 8× 8 theoretical S-boxes satisfying SAC, when only one input bit is in
error out of total K input bits. The number J of S-boxes for each round is given by K
8
. The BER is analytically obtained by
(20)–(26).
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION IN BER SENSE WITH FINITE BLOCKLENGTH
In this section, by combining the strong converse and cryptographic confusion and diffusion,
a transmission scheme that is secure in the BER sense is proposed. Then the rate margins,
security gains, and power optimization are discussed.
A. Combining Strong Converse and Cryptographic Confusion and Diffusion
When Ce < R < Cb, by increasing blocklength n, it is possible to make Bob’s block error
probability arbitrarily small and Eve’s block error probability arbitrarily large. Ensuring small
block error probability at Bob means reliable communication. However, ensuring high block
error probability at Eve does not necessarily mean that the transmission is secure, because a
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Fig. 2. BER at the output of SPN composed of 8×8 practical S-boxes that are adopted for AES [25, Fig. 3.8], when only one
input bit is in error out of total K input bits. The number J of S-boxes for each round is given by K
8
. The BER is numerically
obtained by simulation.
block error event simply means that there is at least a single bit error in the block. As a simple
example, one may consider the case where only a single bit within a codeword is always in error
whenever the codeword is decoded. In this case, the block error probability is one; however, all
other bits except the one are decoded by Eve, which means the communication is never secure.
In order to address this issue, a method to induce high BER at Eve is discussed.
Channel
Encoder
Channel
Decoder
SPN
(no secret key)
Inverse SPN
(no secret key)
K bits n symbolsK bits
K bits K bits
???|?(??|?)
Channel
Decoder
Inverse SPN
(no secret key)
K bits K bits
Alice 
Bob 
Eve 
? ?? ??
???
???????
????
???
??????|?(??|?)
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the proposed scheme.
The block diagram of the proposed scheme is presented in Fig. 3. Using an SPN, Alice
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encrypts message M of length K bits into bit sequence SK of the same length, which is then
encoded into a codeword Xn of length n symbols. Bob performs the inverse processing: he
decodes the received codeword Y nb into bit sequence SˆKb , which is then decrypted into Mˆb by
the inverse SPN. On the other hand, in principle, Eve can design her receiver as she wants, no
matter what it is. In this paper, Eve’s receiver structure is assumed to be the same as Bob’s,
which appears to be a reasonable assumption because otherwise it seems even more difficult for
her to estimate M . Eve decodes the received codeword Y ne into bit sequence SˆKe , which is then
decrypted into Mˆe by the inverse SPN.
At the receiver side (Bob or Eve), if no block decoding error occurs at the channel decoder,
there is no bit error at the input of the inverse SPN, and thus, no output bit errors. On the other
hand, when block decoding error occurs at the channel decoder, there is at least one bit error at
the input of the inverse SPN and the input error(s) will be amplified by the inverse SPN. The
BER PBER(R|C) for a code C at the output of the inverse SPN is given by
PBER(R|C) = P
SPN
BER(r,K)
∣∣
block error
× Perr(R|C) (27)
where Perr(R|C) denotes the block error probability at the output of the decoder and P SPNBER(r,K)
∣∣
block error
is the BER at the output of the inverse SPN given a block error. In order to (analytically or
numerically) compute the BER P SPNBER(r,K)
∣∣
block error
, the initial error distribution qW0(w0) must
be determined from the condition that there was a block error, which means that there was at
least a single bit error at the input of the inverse SPN. However, the exact number of bit errors
within a block is random and the exact distribution of the number of bit errors is unknown.
Furthermore, the exact block error probabilities, Perr(R|C), for Bob and Eve are unknown. In
the following, therefore, we consider their bounds: for Bob, an upper-bound of the ensemble
average E[Perr(R|C)] is used; and for Eve, a lower-bound of Perr(R|C) is used.
For Bob, using ensemble average block error probability upper-bound P berr(R) ≤ P b,Uerr (R, ρ˘, q˘(x))
in (2) and noting that P SPNBER(r,K)
∣∣
block error
is upper-bounded by 0.5,4 the ensemble average BER
of Bob is upper-bounded as follows:
P bBER(R) ≤ 0.5P
b,U
err (R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) (28)
=: P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)). (29)
4Although 0.5 is a trivial BER upper-bound, it is actually tight in our case because the output BER P SPNBER(r,K)
∣
∣
block error
of SPN given a block error is (very) close to 0.5 as long as r is large enough, e.g., r ≥ 10, as shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
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For Eve, using P eerr(R|C) ≥ P e,Lerr (R, ρ˘′, q˘′(x)), ∀C in (14) and P SPNBER(r,K) ≥ P SPN,LBER (r,K), the
BER is lower-bounded as follows:
P eBER(R|C) ≥ P
SPN,L
BER (r,K)P
e,L
err (R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)), ∀C (30)
=: P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) (31)
where P SPN,LBER (r,K) is given by
P SPN,LBER (r,K) = P
SPN
BER(r,K)
∣∣
only one input bit error
. (32)
That is, P SPN,LBER (r,K) denotes the BER at the output of the inverse SPN when there is only a
single input bit error (rather than at least one input bit error), and P SPN,LBER (r,K) can be obtained
by analysis or simulation as in Section II.C.
In general, the optimal distribution q˘(x) making the upper bound tightest and the distribution
q˘′(x) making the lower bound valid for any C are not necessarily the same, i.e., q˘(x) 6= q˘′(x).
For symmetric DMCs, however, they are the same and given by equi-probable distributions.
Lemma 1: For symmetric DMCs including BSC, BEC, and binary input (BI)-AWGN, we
have
q˘(x) = q˘′(x) = qequ(x) (33)
where qequ(x) is the equi-probable distribution.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
In our scheme, two bounds are imposed at the same time given a single transmitter (Alice).
Therefore, it is important to ensure the existence of such code satisfying both bounds. That
is, it must be ensured that at least a code exists for which Bob’s BER (not Bob’s ensemble
average BER) is upper-bounded by P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) and Eve’s BER is lower-bounded by
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) at the same time. Such existence is shown in the following.
Lemma 2: When Ce < R < Cb and a priori probabilities are the same,
∃C such that P bBER(R|C) ≤ P
b,U
BER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) and P
e
BER(R|C) ≥ P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)). (34)
Proof: When R < Cb, there exists at least one code for which Bob’s BER is upper-bounded
by P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)). Furthermore, when R > Ce and a priori probabilities are the same, Eve’s
BER for any code is lower-bounded by P e,LBER(R, ρ˘′, q˘′(x)). Therefore, there must exist a code
satisfying both. 
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For the asymptotic case of infinite blocklength, we have limn→∞ P b,Uerr (R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) = 0 and
limn→∞ P
e,L
err (R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) = 1 when Ce < R < Cb. Thus, Bob’s BER upper-bound and Eve’s
BER lower-bound are asymptotically given by
lim
n→∞
P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) = 0, R < Cb (35)
lim
n→∞
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) = P SPN,LBER (r,K), R > Ce. (36)
Recall that P SPN,LBER (r,K) can be made very close to 0.5 by increasing the number r of rounds,
as demonstrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
B. Rate Upper and Lower Bounds for Finite Blocklength
In practice, the blocklength n is finite, and thus, it is not possible to achieve P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x))→
0 when R < Cb. In this paper, therefore, Bob’s BER upper-bound is constrained to be smaller
than a BER threshold, 0 < Pb,ThBER ≤ 0.5, as follows:
P bBER(R) ≤ P
b,U
BER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) ≤ P
b,Th
BER . (37)
This condition will be referred to as the reliability condition. To adjust Pb,ThBER , it is possible to
use a block error probability threshold 0 < Pb,Therr ≤ 1, which is related to P
b,Th
BER as follows:
Pb,ThBER = 0.5P
b,Th
err . (38)
For high reliability, Pb,Therr should be set small (e.g., 10−6). Similar to Bob’s case, with finite
blocklength n, it is not possible to achieve P e,LBER(R, ρ˘′, q˘′(x)) → P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) for Eve when
R > Ce. Therefore, Eve’s BER lower-bound is constrained to be larger than a BER threshold,
Pe,ThBER with 0 ≤ P
e,Th
BER < P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) as follows:
P eBER(R|C) ≥ P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) ≥ Pe,ThBER, ∀C. (39)
This condition will be referred to as the security condition. To adjust Pe,ThBER, it is possible to use
a block error probability threshold 0 ≤ Pe,Therr < 1, which is related to P
e,Th
BER as follows:
Pe,ThBER = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K)P
e,Th
err . (40)
For high security, Pe,Therr should be set large (e.g., 0.999999).
When the reliability condition is imposed, the highest possible rate is lower than Cb. Also,
when the security condition is imposed, the lowest possible rate is higher than Ce. In the
following, the rate differences are defined.
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Definition 1: The rate margin from above is defined by ∆Rb := Cb−Rsup and the rate margin
from below is defined by ∆Re := Rinf −Ce, where the highest allowable transmission rate Rsup
and the lowest allowable transmission rate Rinf are determined by
Rsup = sup
0≤R<Cb
R subject to P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) ≤ P
b,Th
BER (41)
Rinf = inf
R>Ce
R subject to P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) ≥ Pe,ThBER. (42)

In the following theorem, ∆Rb and ∆Re are analyzed.
Theorem 1: For Pb,Therr = 1, we have ∆Rb = 0. For 0 < Pb,Therr < 1, we have
∆Rb = −
1
nρ˘
lnPb,Therr + Cb −
1
ρ˘
Eb0 (ρ˘, q˘(x)) (43)
≥ −
1
nρ˘
lnPb,Therr (44)
> 0 (45)
where optimal ρ˘ is determined by ρ˘ = argmax0<ρ≤1
{
Eb0 (ρ, q˘(x))− ρRsup
}
. For Pe,Therr = 0, we
have ∆Re = 0. For 0 < Pe,Therr < 1, we have
∆Re =
1
nρ˘′
ln
(
1− Pe,Therr
)
+
1
ρ˘′
Ee0(ρ˘
′, q˘′(x))− Ce (46)
≥
1
nρ˘′
ln
(
1− Pe,Therr
) (47)
> 0 (48)
where optimal ρ˘′ is determined by ρ˘′ = argmax−1<ρ′<0 {Ee0(ρ′, q˘′(x))− ρ′Rinf}. As n → ∞,
both rate margins tend to zero: ∆Rb → 0 and ∆Re → 0.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
From Theorem 1, one can see that, when 0 < Pb,Therr < 1, the rate marge from above ∆Rb is
always positive, inversely proportional to n and ρ˘, and logarithmically inversely proportional to
Pb,Therr . Thus, to reduce ∆Rb, it appears that increasing the blocklength would be more effective
than increasing Pb,Therr . A similar observation can be made for the rate margin from below ∆Re.
Let ∆R = Rsup − Rinf denote the rate interval in which the actual transmit rate R can be
chosen. When ∆R > 0, it is possible for Alice to transmit data reliably and securely satisfying
(37) and (39). However, if ∆R < 0, it is not possible to choose a rate R satisfying both
conditions at the same time, and the data transmission is suspended. Letting ∆C = Cb − Ce
denote the capacity interval, the difference between capacity and rate intervals is given by
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∆C − ∆R = ∆Rb + ∆Re > 0. For the case of fading channels, the intervals are random
variables and we have Pr(∆C < 0) < Pr(∆R < 0), meaning that the data suspension probability
increases with shorter blocklength and stronger reliability/security conditions.
Remark 1: Ideally, the rate margins should have been defined using the constraints P bBER(R) ≤
Pb,ThBER and P eBER(R|C) ≥ P
e,Th
BER, rather from P
b,U
BER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x)) ≤ P
b,Th
BER and
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x)) ≥ Pe,ThBER as in Theorem 1. Thus, the results of Theorem 1 can be interpreted
as follows: There exists at lease one code whose rate margins from above and below are not
larger than ∆Rb and ∆Re, respectively.
C. Security Gap
For some specific codes over BI-AWGN channels, the security gap was defined as the differ-
ence between Bob’s received signal to noise ratio (SNR) required to ensure Bob’s BER smaller
than a threshold and Eve’s received SNR required to ensure Eve’s BER larger than a threshold
[19], [20]. In general, the smaller the security gap, the suitable and more efficient the code for
secure communications based on the BER security measure. By simulating specifically designed
punctured-LDPC codes for BI-AWGN channels, the authors of [19] numerically obtained the
security gap for their own codes. Similarly, in [20], the security gap was numerically obtained
by simulating some specific BCH and LDPC codes combined with scrambling/descrambling for
BI-AWGN channels. In this subsection, a fundamental limit of the security gap for any code
with finite blocklength is studied for our proposed secure communications of combining strong
converse and error amplification.
Consider the unconstrained Gaussian channel, where the received signals at Bob and Eve are
given by
Yb,i = Xi + ηb,i, i = 1, · · · , n (49)
Ye,i = Xi + ηe,i, i = 1, · · · , n (50)
where ηb,i ∼ CN (0, σ2b) and ηe,i ∼ CN (0, σ2e ) represent AWGNs at Bob and Eve, respectively.
The transmitted signal Xi is normalized such that E[|Xi|2] = 1. Then the SNRs at Bob and Eve,
respectively, are given by γb = E[|Xi|
2]
σ2
b
= 1
σ2
b
and γe = E[|Xi|
2]
σ2e
= 1
σ2e
. We now define the security
gap as follows.
Definition 2: For AWGN channels, the security gap ∆S is defined by
∆S := 10 log10
γinfb
γsupe
(51)
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where the lowest SNR γinfb for Bob and the highest SNR γsupe for Eve are determined by
γinfb = inf
γb>γ0
γb subject to P
b,U
BER(R, ρ˘, q˘(x), γb) ≤ P
b,Th
BER (52)
γsupe = sup
0≤γe<γ0
γe subject to P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, q˘′(x), γe) ≥ P
e,Th
BER. (53)
In the above equations, γ0 = C−1AWGN(R), where CAWGN(γ) = ln(1 + γ) denotes the capacity of
AWGN channels. 
In order to determine Bob’s tightest ensemble average BER upper-bound and Eve’s valid BER
lower bound for any code, the optimal input distributions q˘(x) and q˘′(x) must be first determined
by maximizing Eb0 (ρ, q(x), γb) and minimizing Ee0(ρ′, q′(x), γe), respectively. Such optimizations
are generally challenging, because the optimizations should be numerically performed and the
optimal distributions depend on γb, γe, and R (through ρ˘ and ρ˘′). In this subsection, for analytical
tractability, we choose the input distributions as CN (0, 1), which is denoted by qCN (x). With
qCN (x), the upper-bound of Bob’s ensemble average BER and the lower-bound of Eve’s BER
are given in closed-form as follows:
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qCN (x), γb) = 0.5 exp
(
−n
{
Eb0 (ρ, qCN (x), γb)− ρR
}) (54)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qCN (x), γe) = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) · (1− exp (−n {E
e
0(ρ
′, qCN (x), γe)− ρ
′R})) (55)
where
Eb0 (ρ, qCN (x), γb) = − ln
(
1 +
γb
1 + ρ
)−ρ
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (56)
Ee0(ρ
′, qCN (x), γe) = − ln
(
1 +
γe
1 + ρ′
)−ρ′
, − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0. (57)
To determine ∆S for AWGN channels, the highest SNR γinfb and the lowest SNR γsupe are
first obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The solutions to (52) and (53) with q˘(x) = q˘′(x) = qCN (x) are given by
γinfb =

 γ0, if P
b,Th
err = 1
gb(ρ˘), if 0 < Pb,Therr < 1
(58)
γsupe =

 γ0, if P
e,Th
err = 0
ge(ρ˘
′), if 0 < Pe,Therr < 1
(59)
where
gb(ρ) = (1 + ρ)
((
Pb,Therr
)− 1
nρ eR − 1
)
(60)
ge(ρ
′) = (1 + ρ′)
((
1−Pe,Therr
)− 1
nρ′ eR − 1
)
. (61)
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Optimal ρ˘ and ρ˘′ are determined by
ρ˘ = arg min
0<ρ≤1
gb(ρ) (62)
ρ˘′ = arg max
−1<ρ′<0
ge(ρ
′). (63)
The optimal solution ρ˘ to (62) always exists for left-open interval (0, 1] and gb(ρ˘) > γ0. The
optimal solution ρ˘′ to (63) always exists for open interval (−1, 0) and gb(ρ˘′) < γ0. Also gb(ρ˘′)
is positive if and only if the following condition is satisfied:(
1−
2
n
ln(1− Pe,Therr )
)(
1− Pe,Therr
) 1
n eR > 1. (64)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
From the lemma, we immediately have the following result.
Theorem 2: When 0 < Pb,Therr < 1 and 0 < Pe,Therr < 1, the security gap ∆S with q˘(x) =
q˘′(x) = qCN (x) is given by
∆S = 10 log10
(1 + ρ˘)
((
Pb,Therr
)− 1
nρ˘ eR − 1
)
(1 + ρ˘′)
((
1−Pe,Therr
)− 1
nρ˘′
eR − 1
) (65)
where ρ˘ and ρ˘′ are given by (62) and (63), respectively. 
It is not difficult to show limn→∞∆S = 0, which one can expect. Also, if one takes a high
SNR approximation assuming γb ≫ 1 and γe ≫ 1, it is easier to obtain analytical insights into
the security gap. When γb ≫ 1 and γe ≫ 1, the upper-bound of Bob’s ensemble average BER
and the lower-bound of Eve’s BER can be approximated as follows:
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qCN (x), γb) ≃ 0.5 exp
(
−n
{
− ln
(
γb
1 + ρ
)−ρ
− ρR
})
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (66)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qCN (x), γe) ≃ P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) ·
(
1− exp
(
−n
{
− ln
(
γe
1 + ρ′
)−ρ′
− ρ′R
}))
,
−1 < ρ′ ≤ 0. (67)
From the approximate BER bounds, the security gap is obtained as follows:
∆S ≃ −
1
nρ˘
10 log10P
b,Th
err +
1
nρ˘′
10 log10
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+ 10 log10
(
1 + ρ˘
1 + ρ˘′
)
(68)
where 0 < ρ˘ ≤ 1 and −1 < ρ˘′ < 0. From this expression, one can easily see that the security gap
is inversely proportional to n and logarithmically inversely proportional to Pb,Therr and (1−Pe,Therr ).
Note that it is incorrect to interpret (68) to mean that, because R does not explicitly appear
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in (68), ∆S becomes independent of R in high SNR. Since both ρ˘ and ρ˘′ depend on R, the
security gap ∆S still depends on R in high SNR.
Remark 2 (Input distribution): Gaussian distribution does not necessarily maximize Eb0 (ρ, q(x), γb),
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 for all γb and R < Cb. Thus, the ensemble average BER upper-bound (54) is not
necessarily the tightest one. Nevertheless, the upper-bound is still valid in the sense that there
exists a code for which Bob’s BER is upper-bounded by (54). Similarly, Gaussian distribution
does not necessarily minimize Ee0(ρ′, q′(x), γe),−1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 for all γe and R > Ce. In this
case, the BER lower-bound might not be valid in the sense that the BER of some codes might
not be lower-bounded by (55). Consequently, for the particular code(s) whose BER at Bob is
upper-bounded by (54) for all γb and R < Cb, the corresponding BER at Eve might not be
always larger than (55) for all γe and R > Ce. In this sense, Eve’s BER lower-bound of (55)
is optimistic. Nevertheless, using Gaussian input distribution is still useful because it makes the
analysis tractable and gives some insights. Furthermore, it satisfies the asymptotic property (18)
of the distribution, which makes Eve’s block error probability lower-bound valid for all codes,
as follows:
lim
ρ′↑0
1
ρ′
Ee0(ρ
′, qCN (x), γe) = ln (1 + γe) = Ce. (69)
This means that Gaussian input distribution makes (55) valid for any code when ρ′ ↑ 0, which is
optimal ρ′ when R→ Ce from above. Furthermore, Gaussian distribution satisfies the asymptotic
property (11) of the distribution, which makes Bob’s ensemble average block error probability
upper-bound tightest, as follows:
lim
ρ↓0
1
ρ
Ee0(ρ, qCN (x), γb) = ln (1 + γb) = Cb. (70)
This means that Gaussian input distribution makes (54) tightest when ρ ↓ 0, which is optimal ρ
when R→ Cb from below.
Remark 3 (M-ary input AWGN): For one-dimensional or two-dimensional M-ary discrete input
AWGN channels with equi-input probabilities, the security gap ∆S can be obtained by (51),
(52), and (53) by using γ0 = C−1MI−AWGN(R), where CMI−AWGN(γ) denotes the capacity of the
M-ary input AWGN channel given in [34, eq. (1.20)]. Also, Bob’s ensemble average BER upper-
bound and Eve’s BER lower-bound can be obtained in a similar way as in the Gaussian input
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case. As an example, for BI-AWGN, the bounds are given by
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qequ(x), γb) = 0.5×
exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[∫ ∞
−∞
√
γb
2pi
exp
(
−
1
2
γb(y
2
b + 1)
)(
cosh
(
γbyb
1 + ρ
))1+ρ
dyb
]
− ρR
})
(71)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qequ(x), γe) = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K)×(
1− exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[∫ ∞
−∞
√
γe
2pi
exp
(
−
1
2
γe(y
2
e + 1)
)(
cosh
(
γeye
1 + ρ′
))1+ρ′
dye
]
− ρ′R
}))
(72)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and −1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 are optimized to obtain tightest bounds. Unlike the
Gaussian input case, it is difficult to analytically obtain the security gap ∆S for the M-ary
input case because the BER bounds are not given in closed-form. Thus, ∆S should be obtained
numerically.
Remark 4 (BSC and BEC): Although the security gap was originally considered only for
AWGN channels in the literature, the concept can be extended to other channels such as BSC
and BEC. Let εb denote the crossover and erasure probabilities for BSC and BEC, respectively,
for Bob. Let εe denote the crossover and erasure probabilities for BSC and BEC, respectively,
for Eve. It is assumed that 0 ≤ εb < εe ≤ 0.5 for BSC, and 0 ≤ εb < εe ≤ 1 for BEC. Given
R, the security gap can be defined as the difference between the two probabilities as follows:
Definition 3: For BSC and BEC, the security gap is defined as follows:
∆S := εinfe − ε
sup
b ≥ 0 (73)
where εsupb and εinfe are determined by
εsupb = sup
0≤εb<ε0
εb subject to P
b,U
BER(R, ρ˘, qequ(x), εb) ≤ P
b,Th
BER (74)
εinfe = inf
εe>ε0
εe subject to P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, qequ(x), εe) ≥ P
e,Th
BER. (75)
In these equations, ε0 = C−1BSC(R) for BSC and ε0 = C−1BEC(R) for BEC, where CBSC(ε) and
CBEC(ε) are the capacities of BSC and BEC, respectively. 
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For BSC, the BER bounds are given by
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qequ(x), εb)
= 0.5 exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[
2−ρ
(
ε
1
1+ρ
b + (1− εb)
1
1+ρ
)1+ρ]
− ρR
})
(76)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qequ(x), εe)
= P SPN,LBER (r,K) ·
(
1− exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[
2−ρ
′
(
ε
1
1+ρ′
e + (1− εe)
1
1+ρ′
)1+ρ′]
− ρ′R
}))
.
(77)
For BEC, the BER bounds are given by
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qequ(x), εb) = 0.5 exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[
2−ρ(1− εb) + εb
]
− ρR
}) (78)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qequ(x), εe) = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) ·
(
1− exp
(
−n
{
− ln
[
2−ρ
′
(1− εe) + εe
]
− ρ′R
}))
.
(79)
D. Power Optimization for Gaussian-Input Fading Channels
In this subsection, the transmit power is optimized for Gaussian-input fading channels. Let
hb denote the channel from Alice to Bob and he the channel from Alice to Eve, where hb and
he are fixed over the duration of a codeword. The received signals at Bob and Eve are given by
Yb,i = hbXi + ηb,i, i = 1, · · · , n (80)
Ye,i = heXi + ηe,i, i = 1, · · · , n (81)
where ηb,i ∼ CN (0, σ2b) and ηe,i ∼ CN (0, σ2e). The transmit power p is given by p = E[|Xi|2]. Let
Γb =
|hb|
2
σ2
b
denote Bob’s instantaneous channel SNR and Γe = |he|
2
σ2e
denote Eve’s instantaneous
channel SNR. When the input distribution is given by qCN (x) = CN (0, p), the upper-bound of
Bob’s ensemble average BER and the lower-bound of Eve’s BER are given in closed-form as
follows:
P b,UBER(R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p) = 0.5 exp
(
−n
{
− ln
(
1 +
pΓb
1 + ρ
)−ρ
− ρR
})
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 (82)
P e,LBER(R, ρ
′, qCN (x),Γe, p) = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K) ·
(
1− exp
(
−n
{
− ln
(
1 +
pΓe
1 + ρ′
)−ρ′
− ρ′R
}))
,
−1 < ρ′ ≤ 0. (83)
Using these bounds, we first define the reliability, security, and overall outage probabilities
as follows:
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Definition 4: The reliability outage is declared whenever P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, qCN (x),Γb, p) > Pb,ThBER ,
the security outage is declared whenever P e,LBER(R, ρ˘′, qCN (x),Γe, p) < P
e,Th
BER, and the overall
outage is declared whenever P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, qCN (x),Γb, p) > P
b,Th
BER or P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, p) <
Pe,ThBER. The reliability, security, and overall outage probabilities are given by
P relout(R, p) = Pr
(
P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, qCN (x),Γb, p) > P
b,Th
BER
)
(84)
P secout(R, p) = Pr
(
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, p) < P
e,Th
BER
)
(85)
P overallout (R, p) = Pr
(
P b,UBER(R, ρ˘, qCN (x),Γb, p) > P
b,Th
BER or P
e,L
BER(R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, p) < P
e,Th
BER
)
.
(86)

Now, the transmit power is optimized to minimize the reliability outage probability subject
to an average power constraint and the security condition for Eve:
min
p(Γb,Γe)
P relout(R, p(Γb,Γe)) (87a)
subject to p(Γb,Γe) ≥ 0 (87b)
E[p(Γb,Γe)] ≤ pav (87c)
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe)) ≥ P
e,Th
BER (87d)
where the transmit power p(Γb,Γe) is denoted as an explicit function of Γb and Γe.
When Pb,ThBER = 0.5 or Pb,Therr = 1, the reliability outage probability is always zero. Also,
when Pe,ThBER = 0 or Pe,Therr = 0, the security constraint is degenerate. Therefore, focusing on
0 < Pb,Therr < 1 and 0 < Pe,Therr < 1, the optimal solution is derived in the following.
Theorem 3: For 0 < Pb,Therr < 1 and 0 < Pe,Therr < 1, the optimal solution to (87) is given by
popt(Γb,Γe) =

 pmin(Γb, ρ˘), if pmin(Γb, ρ˘) ≤ pmax(Γe, ρ˘
′) and pmin(Γb, ρ˘) ≤ zopt
0, if pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > pmax(Γe, ρ˘
′) or pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > zopt
(88)
where
pmin(Γb, ρ) = Γ
−1
b gb(ρ) (89)
pmax(Γe, ρ
′) = Γ−1e ge(ρ
′) (90)
zopt = max{z : z ≥ 0,E[popt(Γb,Γe)] ≤ pav}. (91)
In the above equations, gb(ρ), ge(ρ′), ρ˘′, and ρ˘′ are respectively given by (60), (61), (62), and
(63).
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Proof: See the Appendix D. 
The optimal power popt(Γb,Γe) derived in Theorem 3 can be intuitively explained as follows.
Firstly, in order to avoid any reliability outage at Bob, at least certain amount of transmit power
should be used. Given Γb, power pmin(Γb, ρ) is the minimum instantaneous power required
to satisfy Bob’s reliability condition P b,UBER(R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p) ≤ P
b,Th
BER . However, when we
consider Eve, too much transmit power leads to weak security, because with higher power she
can more easily decode the codeword. In order to enhance security for Eve and eventually to
avoid any security outage at Eve, less transmit power should be used to ensure lower SNR at
Eve. Given Γe, power pmax(Γe, ρ′) is the maximum instantaneous allowable power to satisfy the
security condition P e,LBER(R, ρ′, qCN (x),Γe, p) ≥ P
e,Th
BER. Overall, any transmit power in the interval
[pmin(Γe, ρ), pmax(Γb, ρ
′)] satisfies both reliability and security conditions. With the average
power constraint, however, the transmit power must be set to a minimum possible level by
popt(Γb,Γe) = pmin(Γe, ρ), to minimize the reliability outage probability by most efficiently
utilizing the power on average.
Secondly, the case of popt(Γb,Γe) = 0 in Theorem 3 can be explained as follows. When
pmin(Γb, ρ) is greater than pmax(Γb, ρ′), it is not possible to satisfy both the reliability and
security requirements at the same time, and thus, the data transmission must be suspended
i.e., popt(Γb,Γe) = 0. Furthermore, due to the average power constraint, the transmission is
suspended by setting popt(Γb,Γe) = 0 whenever the minimum power required is too large, i.e.,
pmin(Γb, ρ) > z. Let Psus(R, p(Γb,Γe)) denote the data transmission suspension probability given
by
Psus(R, p(Γb,Γe)) = Pr(p(Γb,Γe) = 0). (92)
Then z is maximized under the average power constraint in order to minimize the suspension
probability, which is a necessary condition for reliability outage probability minimization because
reliability outage occurs whenever p(Γb,Γe) = 0. The condition of pmin(Γb, ρ) > zopt can be
rewritten as
Γb <
gb(ρ)
zopt
. (93)
This means that, for efficient power consumption, the data transmission must be suspended when
Bob’s instantaneous channel SNR Γb is worse than a threshold.
Finally, the reason why optimal ρ˘ and ρ˘′ in Theorem 3 are obtained by (62) and (63), respec-
tively, can be explained as follows. In order to minimize Psus(R, p(Γb,Γe)) or Pr(p(Γb,Γe) = 0),
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the value of ρ must be optimized to minimize pmin(Γb, ρ), which is equivalent to the optimiza-
tion in (62). Also, ρ′ must be optimized to maximize pmax(Γe, ρ′), which is equivalent to the
optimization in (63). The computational complexities required for these optimization are not
high because each of ρ˘ and ρ˘′ can be individually obtained by one-dimensional searching.
From Theorem 3, we also have the following result.
Corollary 1: With the optimal power popt(Γb,Γe) of Theorem 3, we have
P relout(R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = P
overall
out (R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = Psus(R, popt(Γb,Γe)) (94)
P secout(R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = 0. (95)
Proof: First, when popt(Γb,Γe) = 0, we have Pr
(
P e,LBER (R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, 0) < P
e,Th
BER
)
= 0,
because P e,LBER(R, ρ˘′, qCN (x),Γe, 0) = 0.5 with probability one. Second, when popt(Γb,Γe) =
pmin(Γb, ρ˘), we have Pr
(
P e,LBER(R, ρ˘
′, qCN (x),Γe, pmin(Γb, ρ˘)) < P
e,Th
BER
)
= 0, because P e,LBER(R, ρ˘′,
qCN (x),Γe, pmin(Γb, ρ˘)) = P
e,Th
BER with probability one as shown in Appendix D. It follows from
the total probability theorem that P secout(R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = 0. Given this, it is straightforward to
show P relout(R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = P overallout (R, popt(Γb,Γe)) = Psus(R, popt(Γb,Γe)). 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
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Fig. 4. Rate differences ∆Rb and ∆Re for BSC with εb = 0.01 and εe = 0.3.
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Fig. 5. Rate differences ∆Rb and ∆Re for BI-AWGN with γb = 6 dB and γe = −2 dB.
In this section, we present numerical results for the proposed secure communication method.
First, we present the numerical results of rate margins ∆Rb and ∆Re obtained in Theorem 1. Dif-
ferent reliability and security requirements are tested by considering Pb,Therr ∈ {1, 0.01, 0.0001, 0.000001}
and Pe,Therr ∈ {0, 0.99, 0.9999, 0.999999}. Recall that Bob’s BER upper-bound threshold is given
by Pb,ThBER = 0.5Pb,Therr and Eve’s BER lower-bound threshold is given by P
e,Th
BER = P
SPN,L
BER (r,K)P
e,Th
err .
Fig. 4 shows ∆Rb and ∆Re for BSC with εb = 0.01 and εe = 0.3 for different blocklengths
102 ≤ n ≤ 106. Also, Fig. 5 shows ∆Rb and ∆Re for BI-AWGN with γb = 6 dB and γe = −2
dB. One can see that as the blocklength n increases, ∆Rb and ∆Re approach zero as expected
in Theorem 1. With weaker reliability and security requirements (i.e., larger Pb,Therr and smaller
Pe,Therr ), the rate margins decrease.
Second, we present the numerical results for the security gap ∆S obtained in Theorem 2. Fig.
6 shows the region where the condition of (64) is satisfied. It can be easily seen that the condition
is satisfied for all practical cases, e.g., for all R with n > 10. Fig. 7 shows the security gaps for
BI-AWGN with R = 0.5 (nats/one-dimensional-channel use) and Gaussian-input (GI) AWGN
with R = 1 (nats/two-dimensional-channel use). It can be seen that, for the same reliability and
security conditions, Gaussian input gives smaller security gap than binary input.
We now consider fading channels, where |hb| and |he| are modeled by Rayleigh random
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Fig. 6. Region where eq. (64) is satisfied.
variables with E[|hb|2] = 2 and E[|he|2] = 1 and we set σ2b = σ2e = σ2. Generating the channels
105 times, we numerically obtain the reliability outage probability P relout(R, p) of (84), the security
outage probability P secout(R, p) of (85), and the overall outage probability P overallout (R, p) of (86).
Note that when |hb| < |he| (i.e., Cb < Ce), it is never possible to avoid both reliability and
security outages at the same time no matter which rate R and transmit power p are used. In the
following, therefore, we evaluate the outage probabilities only when |hb| > |he|. The reliability
and security conditions are set to Pb,Therr = 0.0001 and Pe,Therr = 0.9999. The blocklength n is
set to 105. We first consider the case of equal (or constant) transmit power, where the transmit
power p is set to pav. Fig. 8 shows the outage probabilities with the equal transmit power for
different rates R ∈ {0.5, 3.0, 5.5} (nats/two-dimensional-channel use). Given rate R, as pav/σ2
increases, the reliability outage probability decreases, whereas the security outage probability
increases as can be expected. Consequently, the overall outage probability always remains high
(e.g., larger than say 0.4), because both reliability and security outage probabilities cannot be
decreased at the same time.
For the proposed optimal power allocation of Theorem 3, Fig. 9 shows the outage probabilities
with the same system parameters of Fig. 8. The obtained security outage probability of the
optimal power allocation is exactly zero, which cannot be plotted in the figure of log-scale
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outage probability. The reliability probability, the overall outage probability, and the suspension
probability are the same, as expected from Corollary 1. As pav/σ2 increases, the overall outage
probability (or suspension probability) decreases and then flattens.5 However, the achieved lowest
overall outage probability of the optimal power allocation is much lower than that of the constant
transmit power case. The reason why there is an error floor for the overall outage probability or
suspension probability is as follows. The suspension probability is given by Pr(popt(Γb,Γe) = 0).
From Theorem 3, the suspension probability can be decreased only by reducing the probabilities
of pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > pmax(Γe, ρ˘′) and pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > zopt. By increasing pav, it is possible to reduce
the probability of pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > zopt. However, it is not possible to reduce the probability
of pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > pmax(Γe, ρ˘′) by increasing power pav. In order to reduce the probability of
pmin(Γb, ρ˘) > pmax(Γe, ρ˘
′), Bob’s channel must be made even better (i.e., larger Γb) or Eve’s
channel must be made even worse (i.e., smaller Γe). Only in this case, the suspension outage
probability is further decreased. Fig. 10 shows the overall outage probabilities for the equal
power and optimal power allocations for such channel scenario where Bob’s channel is much
5This is in sharp contrast to the case of conventional power optimization without a security condition, in which the outage
probability (or suspension probability) decreases indefinitely with pav/σ2 [35].
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Fig. 8. Reliability outage probability P relout(R, pav) of (84), security outage probability P secout(R,pav) of (85), and overall
outage probability P overallout (R, pav) of (86) with constant transmit power with p = pav . Pb,Therr = 0.0001 and Pe,Therr = 0.9999.
E[|hb|
2] = 2 and E[|he|2] = 1. Blocklength n is 105.
better than Eve’s channel: E[|hb|2] = 10 and E[|he|2] = 1. In this channel scenario, the floors
of the overall outage probabilities are lower for both equal and optimal power allocations. But,
the performance gap between the two power allocations is still significant.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a secure data transmission method has been studied, where the security measure
was given in terms of the BER at the eavesdropper. To realize such secure communication,
information-theoretic strong converse and cryptographic error amplification have been combined.
For finite blocklengths, the maximum and minimum allowable transmission rates and the security
gap have been analyzed for any block codes over DMCs. It has been observed that increasing the
blocklength is very effective to reduce the rate loss and the security gap. For fading channels, the
transmission power has been optimized. It has been found that simply increasing the transmission
power does not decrease the reliability outage probability indefinitely. The error floor of the
reliability outage probability depends on the channel quality difference between Bob and Eve.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For symmetric DMCs, it is well-known that Eb0 (ρ, q(x)), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, is maximized by equi-
probable distribution qequ(x) [36, Theorem 7.2]. In the following, therefore, we will only show
that Ee0(ρ′, q′(x)),−1 < ρ′ ≤ 0, is also minimized by qequ(x).
The proof of this appendix is only for finite input and output alphabet sizes. But, the approach
holds for well-behaved channels with infinite alphabet sizes. For x ∈ {a1, · · · , aQ}, let us define
α(ye,q) as follows
α(ye,q) =
∑
x
q(x)fYe|X(ye|x)
1/(1+ρ′), − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 (A.1)
=
Q∑
k=1
qkfYe|X(ye|x)
1/(1+ρ′), − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 (A.2)
where q = (q1, · · · , qQ) = (q(x = a1), · · · , q(x = aQ)). Because α(ye,q) is linear in q and
the function α1+ρ′ is concave in α, α(y,q)1+ρ′ must be concave in q. Letting F (ρ′,q) =
exp(−Ee0(ρ
′,q)) =
∑
ye
α(ye,q), the function F (ρ′,q) is concave, because it is the sum of
concave functions. Then F (ρ′,q) has a minimum for some q0.
Following [23, Theorem 4.4.1], the necessary and sufficient conditions that F (ρ′,q) is mini-
mized at q0 are
∂F (ρ′,q)
∂qk
∣∣∣∣
q=q0
≤ λ, k = 1, 2, · · · , Q;−1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 (A.3)
where λ is a constant and the equality holds whenever qk 6= 0 (i.e., qk > 0). Using [23, Theorem
5.6.5], the necessary and sufficient conditions on q which maximize F (ρ′,q), equivalently,
minimize Ee0(ρ′,q), are∑
ye
fYe|X(ye|x)
1/(1+ρ′)α(ye,q)
ρ′ ≤
∑
ye
α(ye,q)
1+ρ′, − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0 (A.4)
where equality holds for which qk > 0. Finally, for symmetric DMCs, the equi-probable
distribution qk = 1Q satisfies the following condition [36, Theorem 7.2]:∑
ye
fYe|X(ye|x)
1/(1+ρ′)α(ye,q)
ρ′ =
∑
ye
α(ye,q)
1+ρ′ , − 1 < ρ′ ≤ 0. (A.5)
This complete the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For Rsup, the optimization problem is
sup
0≤R<Cb
R subject to min
0≤ρ≤1
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) ≤ P
b,Th
err (B.1)
where P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) = 2P
b,U
BER(R, ρ, q˘(x)). First, we consider the case of Pb,Therr = 1. In this
case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, Rsup = sup0≤R<Cb R = Cb. Second, we consider
the case of 0 < Pb,Therr < 1. For ρ = 0, we have P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) = 1. However, we know that
min0≤ρ≤1 P
b,U
err (R, ρ, q˘(x)) < 1 because max0≤ρ≤1{Eb0 (ρ, q˘(x)) − ρR} > 0 for R < Cb. Thus,
the optimal ρ˘ must be in 0 < ρ˘ ≤ 1. That is, we have ρ˘(R) = argmin0<ρ≤1 P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) =
argmax0<ρ≤1
{
Eb0 (ρ, q˘(x))− ρR
}
, where
{
Eb0 (ρ, q˘(x))− ρR
}
is convex in ρ ∈ (0, 1] for R <
Cb [23, Proof of Theorem 5.6.3]. Because P b,Uerr (R, ρ, q˘(x)) is a monotonically decreasing func-
tion of R, the constraint must be satisfied with equality to maximize R: P b,Uerr (Rsup, ρ, q˘(x)) =
Pb,Therr . Thus, we have
Rsup =
1
nρ˘(Rsup)
lnPb,Therr +
1
ρ˘(Rsup)
Eb0 (ρ˘(Rsup), q˘(x)) (B.2)
(a)
≤
1
nρ˘(Rsup)
lnPb,Therr +
1
ρ˘(Rsup)
max
q(x)
Eb0 (ρ˘(Rsup), q(x)) (B.3)
(b)
≤
1
nρ˘(Rsup)
lnPb,Therr +max
q(x)
∂
∂ρ
Eb0 (ρ, q(x))
∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
(B.4)
=
1
nρ˘(Rsup)
lnPb,Therr +max
q(x)
Ib(q(x)) (B.5)
=
1
nρ˘(Rsup)
lnPb,Therr + Cb (B.6)
(c)
< Cb (B.7)
where (b) is due to [15, eq.(34)] and (c) is valid for any 0 < Pb,Therr < 1. When n →
∞, we have Rsup → Cb from below, because the constraint becomes always satisfied by
min0≤ρ≤1 P
b,U
err (R, ρ, q˘(x)) → 0 for any R < Cb as n → ∞. Also, when n → ∞, we have
∆Rb → 0.
For Rinf , the optimization problem is
inf
R>Ce
R subject to max
−1<ρ′≤0
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, q˘′(x)) ≥ Pe,Therr (B.8)
where P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q˘′(x)) = P
e,L
BER(R, ρ
′, q˘′(x))/PSPN,LBER (r,K). We first consider the case of Pe,Therr =
0. In this case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, Rinf = infR>Ce R = Ce. Second,
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consider the case of 0 < Pe,Therr < 1. For ρ′ = 0, we have P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q˘′(x)) = 0. However,
we know that max−1<ρ′≤0 P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q˘′(x)) > 0 because max−1<ρ′≤0{Ee0(ρ′, q˘′(x))− ρ′R} > 0
for R > Ce. Thus, the optimal ρ˘′ must be in −1 < ρ˘′ < 0. That is, we have ρ˘′(R) =
argmax−1<ρ<0 P
e,L
err (R, ρ
′, q˘′(x)) = argmax−1<ρ′<0 {Ee0(ρ
′, q˘′(x))− ρ′R}, where {Ee0(ρ′, q˘′(x))− ρ′R}
is convex in ρ′ ∈ (−1, 0) for R > Ce [15], [24, Lemma 3.2.1]. Because P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, q˘′(x)) is
a monotonically decreasing function of R, the constraint must be satisfied with equality to
minimize R: max−1<ρ′≤0 P e,Lerr (Rinf , ρ′, q˘′(x)) = Pe,Therr . Thus, we have
Rinf =
1
nρ˘′(Rinf)
ln
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+
1
ρ˘′(Rinf)
Ee0(ρ˘
′(Rinf), q˘
′(x)) (B.9)
=
1
nρ′(Rinf)
ln
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+
1
ρ˘′(Rinf)
min
q(x)
Ee0(ρ˘
′(Rinf), q(x)) (B.10)
(d)
≥
1
nρ˘′(Rinf)
ln
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+max
q(x)
∂
∂ρ′
Ee0(ρ
′, q(x))
∣∣∣∣
ρ′=0
(B.11)
=
1
nρ˘′(Rinf)
ln
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+max
q(x)
Ie(q(x)) (B.12)
=
1
nρ˘′(Rinf)
ln
(
1−Pe,Therr
)
+ Ce (B.13)
(e)
> Ce (B.14)
where (d) is due to [15, eq.(37)] and (e) is valid for any 0 < Pe,Therr < 1. When n →
∞, we have Rinf → Ce from above, because the constraint becomes always satisfied by
min−1≤ρ′≤0 P
e,L
err (R, ρ
′, q˘′(x)) → 1 for any R > Ce as n → ∞. Thus, when n → ∞, we
have ∆Re → 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For γinfb , the optimization problem is
inf
γb>γ0
γb subject to min
0≤ρ≤1
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x), γb) ≤ P
b,Th
err (C.1)
where P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x), γb) = 2P
b,U
BER(R, ρ, qCN (x), γb). First, we consider the case of Pb,Therr =
1. In this case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, γinfb = infγb>γ0 γb = γ0. Second, we
consider the case of 0 < Pb,Therr < 1. As shown in Appendix B, the interval for optimizing ρ can
be restricted to 0 < ρ ≤ 1. For this interval, the constraint can be rewritten as
γb ≥ min
0<ρ≤1
(1 + ρ)
((
Pb,Therr
)− 1
nρ eR − 1
)
= min
0<ρ≤1
gb(ρ). (C.2)
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Thus, γinfb = infγb≥γ0 γb = gb(ρ˘), where optimal ρ˘ is given by ρ˘ = argmin0<ρ≤1 gb(ρ). Finally,
we show the existence of ρ˘ for left-open interval (0, 1]. For all 0 < ρ ≤ 1, it is straightforward
to show
gb(ρ) > γ0 ≥ 0 (C.3)
lim
ρ→0+
∂
∂ρ
gb(ρ) = −∞ (C.4)
lim
ρ→1
∂
∂ρ
gb(ρ) = ube
R − 1 > 0 (C.5)
∂2
∂ρ2
gb(ρ) > 0 (C.6)
where ub =
(
Pb,Therr
)− 1
n > 1. Therefore, the optimal ρ minimizing gb(ρ) must not be ρ → 0+,
and a solution exists in (0, 1].
For γsupe , the optimization problem is
sup
0≤γe<γ0
γe subject to max
−1<ρ′≤0
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, qCN (x), γe) ≥ P
e,Th
err (C.7)
where P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, qCN (x), γe) = P
e,L
BER(R, ρ
′, qCN (x), γe)/P
SPN,L
BER (r,K). First, we consider the
case of Pe,Therr = 0. In this case, the constraint is always satisfied. Thus, γsupe = sup0≤γe<γ0 γe =
γ0. Second, we consider the case of 0 < Pe,Therr < 1. As shown in Appendix B, the interval for
optimizing ρ′ can be restricted to −1 < ρ′ < 0. For this interval, the constraint can be rewritten
as
γe ≤ max
−1<ρ′<0
(1 + ρ′)
((
1− Pe,Therr
)− 1
nρ′ eR − 1
)
= max
−1<ρ′<0
γe(ρ
′). (C.8)
Thus, γsupe = sup0≤γe<γ0 γe = ge(ρ˘′), where optimal ρ˘′ is given by ρ˘′ = argmax−1<ρ′<0 γe(ρ′).
Finally, we consider the existence of ρ˘′ for open interval (−1, 0). It is straightforward to show
ge(ρ
′) < γ0 (C.9)
lim
ρ′→−1
ge(ρ
′) = 0 (C.10)
lim
ρ′→0−
ge(ρ
′) = −1 (C.11)
lim
ρ′→−1
∂
∂ρ′
ge(ρ
′) = (1 + 2 ln ue)u
−1
e e
R − 1 (C.12)
where ue =
(
1−Pe,Therr
)− 1
n > 1. From (C.10) and (C.11), ge(ρ′) cannot be maximized by
ρ′ → 0−. If limρ′→−1 ∂∂ρ′ge(ρ
′) > 0, from (C.10) and (C.11), it is clear that ge(ρ′) cannot
be maximized by ρ′ → −1 and a solution must exist in (−1, 0). Furthermore, in this case, the
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maximum value ge(ρ˘′) must be positive due to (C.10). On the other hand, if limρ′→−1 ∂∂ρ′ge(ρ) =(
(1 + 2 lnue)u
−1
e e
R − 1
)
≤ 0, we have ge(ρ′) = (1+ρ′)
(
u
1
ρ′
e eR − 1
)
< (1+ρ′)
(
u−1e e
R − 1
)
<
(1 + ρ′)
(
(1 + 2 lnue)u
−1
e e
R − 1
)
≤ 0 for all −1 < ρ′ < 0. Thus, it follows from (C.10) that a
solution does not exist for the open interval of (−1, 0).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The optimization problem is
min
p(Γb,Γe)
Pr
(
min
0≤ρ≤1
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p(Γb,Γe)) > P
b,Th
err
)
(D.1a)
subject to p(Γb,Γe) ≥ 0 (D.1b)
E[p(Γb,Γe)] ≤ pav (D.1c)
max
−1<ρ′≤0
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe)) ≥ P
e,Th
err (D.1d)
where P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p(Γb,Γe)) = 2P
b,U
BER(R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p(Γb,Γe)) and P e,Lerr (R, ρ′,
qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe)) = P
e,L
BER(R, ρ
′, qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe))/P
SPN,L
BER (r,K). As shown in Appendix
B, the interval for optimizing ρ can be restricted to 0 < ρ ≤ 0 and the interval for optimizing ρ′
can be restricted to −1 < ρ′ < 0. In (D.1), ρ is optimized to minimize P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p).
But, this is equivalent to optimizing ρ to minimize the outage probability. Also, in (D.1), ρ′
is optimized to maximize P e,Lerr (R, ρ′, qCN (x),Γe, p), which maximizes the probability that the
instantaneous security condition (D.1d) is satisfied. But, this is equivalent to optimizing ρ′ to
minimize the outage probability, because an outage is declared whenever the condition is not
satisfied. Therefore, the problem of (D.1) is equivalent to the following:
min
0<ρ≤1,−1<ρ′<0
min
p(Γb,Γe,ρ,ρ′)
Pr
(
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)) > Pb,Therr
) (D.2a)
subject to p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′) ≥ 0 (D.2b)
E[p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)] ≤ pav (D.2c)
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)) ≥ Pe,Therr (D.2d)
where power p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ′) is denoted as an explicit function of ρ and ρ′.
First, we focus on the inner optimization over p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ′), and then we later solve the
outer optimization over ρ and ρ′. In order to solve the inner optimization problem, following the
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approach of [35], we consider the problem of minimizing power to avoid any reliability outage
along with the original constraints except the total average power constraint as follows:
min p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′) (D.3a)
subject to p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′) ≥ 0 (D.3b)
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)) ≤ Pb,Therr (D.3c)
P e,Lerr (R, ρ
′, qCN (x),Γe, p(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)) ≥ Pe,Therr . (D.3d)
It can be shown that, from the reliability condition of (D.3c), the solution to this optimization
problem must be given in the form of pmin(Γb, ρ) = 1Γbgb(ρ). Furthermore, from the security
condition of (D.3d), pmin(Γb, ρ) can be a valid solution only when the following inequality is
satisfied:
pmin(Γb, ρ) ≤ pmax(Γb, ρ
′) (D.4)
where pmax(Γe, ρ′) = 1Γe ge(ρ
′). Then, following [35, Proposition 4], the optimal solution to the
inner optimization problem of (D.2) is given by
popt(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′) =


pmin(Γb, ρ), if pmin(Γb, ρ) ≤ pmax(Γe, ρ′) and pmin(Γb, ρ) ≤ zopt
0, if pmin(Γb, ρ) ≤ pmax(Γe, ρ
′) and pmin(Γb, ρ) > zopt
0, if pmin(Γb, ρ) > pmax(Γe, ρ
′)
(D.5)
where zopt is determined such that the average power constraint is satisfied:
zopt = max{z : z ≥ 0,E[popt(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ
′)] ≤ pav}. (D.6)
We now solve the outer optimization of (D.2), i.e., optimizing ρ and ρ′ to minimize the
reliability outage probability:
(ρ˘, ρ˘′) = min
0<ρ≤1,−1<ρ′<0
Pr
(
P b,Uerr (R, ρ, qCN (x),Γb, p) > P
b,Th
err
)∣∣
p=popt(Γb,Γe,ρ,ρ′)
. (D.7)
Because the reliability outage occurs if and only if popt(Γb,Γe, ρ, ρ′) = 0, we have
(ρ˘, ρ˘′) = min
0<ρ≤1,−1<ρ′<0
Pr (pmin(Γb, ρ) > pmax(Γe, ρ
′) or pmin(Γb, ρ) > zopt) . (D.8)
This joint optimization for ρ and ρ′ is equivalent to two independent optimizations: min0<ρ≤1 pmin(Γb, ρ)
and max−1<ρ′<0 pmax(Γe, ρ′), which are equivalent to (62) and (63), respectively. Note that these
optimizations are independent of Γb and Γe; that is, ρ˘ and ρ˘′ are independent of the instantaneous
channels.
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